

OFFICIAL INFORMATIONCONFIDENTIAL**EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1040
INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE**

DATE: July 16, 2020
TO: Honorable Board of Police Commissioners
FROM: Inspector General
SUBJECT: NON-TACTICAL UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE 044-19 FOR 7/21/20
CLOSED-SESSION AGENDA

<u>Division</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duty-On (X) Off ()</u>	<u>Uniform-Yes (X) No ()</u>
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West LA	9/15/2019	2:13 a.m.		
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<u>Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force</u>	<u>Length of Service</u>
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Juatco, M./PO I	11 months
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Total Involved Officer(s)

1 x PO I

<u>Suspects</u>	<u>Deceased ()</u>	<u>Wounded ()</u>	<u>Non-Hit ()</u>
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Does not apply.

COP Recommendations

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Officer Juatco.

Drawing/Exhibiting – Does Not Apply.

Unintentional Discharge – Administrative Disapproval, Negligent Discharge,
Officer Juatco.

IG Recommendations

Tactics – Same as COP.

Drawing/Exhibiting – Does Not Apply.

Unintentional Discharge – Same as COP.

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INVESTIGATION

Annotated Force Investigation Division Incident Summary¹

On September 14, 2019, Police Officer III Jonathan Chavez, Serial No. 40964, and Police Officer I Michael Juatco, Serial No. 43456, and were assigned 8A36W7. To date, the two had worked approximately seven shifts together. According to Officer Chavez, he instructed Officer Juatco how to load, unload and secure patrol rifle in the rack of the black and white police vehicle on the first day they worked together. In addition, Chavez stated he also taught Juatco how to remove the patrol rifle from the vehicle's rifle rack. This was a standard practice Officer Chavez employed with all his probationary officers. He explained that he did so to prepare his less tenured partners in case they became involved in an incident that required them to arm themselves with the rifle. According to Officer Chavez, an example of such an incident might include, but not be limited to, a response to an active shooter in which he was struck by gunfire and unable to address the suspect. Although Officer Juatco had not attended the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Rifle School, it was Officer Chavez's belief that his partner should have a basic understanding of how to manipulate the rifle and engage a suspect if that became necessary.

According to Officer Chavez, at the start of their watch on September 14, 2019, he did not specifically instruct Officer Juatco to retrieve the rifle from the kit room and secure it in the vehicle's rifle rack. Officer Juatco took the initiative of doing so on his own. He also took it upon himself to return the rifle to the kit room at the end of watch without being told to do so.

On September 14, 2019, at approximately 0145 hours, Officer Chavez believed he removed the rifle from the police vehicle, verified the firing chamber was empty and placed it into the rifle bag with the magazine inserted in the magazine well. He then believed he turned the bagged rifle into the kit room.

Note: According to Officer Juatco, he believed it was he who removed the rifle from the police vehicle and secured it in the kit room at the end of their shift on the morning of September 14, 2019.

On September 14, 2019, at approximately 1545 hours, Officer Juatco checked out a .40MM Less Lethal Launcher, a Remington 870 shotgun and his partner's patrol rifle from the kit room. After carrying the equipment to his assigned police vehicle, Shop No. 81944, he began securing the items in the vehicle. According to Juatco, he first removed the rifle, with the rifle magazine already inserted into the magazine well, from the rifle bag. Prior to placing the rifle into the vehicle's rifle rack, he conducted a

¹ The Incident Summary presented here is reproduced from FID's report regarding this case, and is supplemented with annotations by the OIG. All OIG annotations are referenced as an "OIG Note." All other references and citations in the reproduced FID Incident Summary (e.g., Investigators' Notes or Addenda Items) are reproduced directly from FID's report. Unless otherwise stated, all information provided in OIG annotations is derived from FID's investigation of this incident.

chamber check and verified the firing chamber was empty. Juatco then placed the rifle into the rifle rack situated between the front seats of the police vehicle and activated the locking mechanism, thereby securing the rifle in the rifle rack.

According to Officer Chavez, he was conducting administrative duties in the report writing room and was not present when Officer Juatco loaded the equipment into their vehicle. Upon his (Chavez's) arrival at their police vehicle he saw that all three weapon systems were secured in their respective racks in the driver's compartment. According to Officer Chavez he did not verify the rifle's condition and it was not deployed by him or his partner during their watch.

Note: All times referred to in this investigation were taken from the timestamp of the station surveillance camera that was affixed to the west facing wall, approximately five feet above the ground and pointed in a southwest direction.

At the end of their shift on September 15, 2019, at 0213:07 hours, Officer Juatco was in the driver's seat of his police vehicle that was backed into a parking stall just outside the rear door of the West Los Angeles (WLA) station. Officer Juatco logged off the Mobile Data Computer (MDC) then turned toward the rifle secured in the rifle rack. He disengaged the locking mechanism on the rifle rack and with his left hand grabbed the handguard near the base of the barrel. He pulled the rifle toward him and a round was discharged from the rifle while it was still seated in the rifle rack. The rifle was pointed upward, resulting in the fired projectile exiting through the roof and going through the emergency light bar of the police vehicle.

Note: Neither the fired projectile nor any of its fragments were located.

At approximately 0213:20 hours, Officer Chavez and Police Officers II Frank Ochoa, Serial No. 42810, and Omar Ruiz, Serial No. 42815, and Police Officer I Pete Kong, Serial No. 43251, were captured on the station surveillance video exiting the station's rear door after hearing the single gunshot. Police Officer II Charlie Limon, Serial No. 41257, was in the main parking lot when he heard the single shot.

Lieutenant I Robert Weise, Serial No. 35528, Watch Commander, WLA Patrol Division, was inside the watch commander's office when he heard a loud noise. Shortly afterward, Officer Chavez walked into the watch commander's office and notified Lieutenant Weise of the Non-Tactical Unintentional Discharge (NTUD). At 0215:54 hours, Lieutenant Weise exited the rear door and checked on the officers to make sure they were uninjured. According to Lieutenant Weise, Officer Juatco did not complain of any injuries. Lieutenant Weise looked inside the vehicle and observed the damage to the roof. He then gathered the necessary information from Officer Juatco to make the required notifications.² According to Lieutenant Weise, he did not give Officer Chavez

² According to Lieutenant Weise, the exchange he had with Officer Juatco sufficiently served as the required Public Safety Statement (PSS).

any direction regarding holding the crime scene for a Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) investigation.

At 0219:31 hours, Officer Chavez is captured on surveillance video approaching the open driver's door of the police vehicle. According to Officer Chavez, when he looked inside he observed the rifle in the rack with the locking mechanism open. He assumed the rifle was loaded with a live round in the chamber and did not feel safe leaving the weapon in that condition. After seeing the safety in the "Off" position, Officer Chavez engaged the safety on the rifle and removed it from the rifle rack. He then removed the magazine from the magazine well and cleared the live round from the chamber. During this time Chavez also located and collected the Discharged Cartridge Casing (DCC) from inside the police vehicle.

Note: According to Lieutenant Weise, when he stepped out to inspect the scene and speak to the officers, he could not recall if the rifle was in the police vehicle or if it had already been rendered safe and secured in the kit room.

At 0220:31 hours, Officer Chavez walked into the station with the rifle in hand and secured it in the kit room.

Having been directed to do so by Officer Chavez, Officer Juatco removed the remainder of the equipment (shotgun, .40MM and equipment bags) from their vehicle. At 0224:48 hours, Officer Juatco closed the driver door and back hatch before entering the station with the equipment.

Lieutenant Weise monitored both officers in the watch commander's office until he assigned Sergeant I Marco Briones, Serial No.31635, to monitor Officer Juatco.

Detective II Alejandro Soria, Serial No. 36350, Force Investigation Division (FID), conducted a magazine count at WLA station. The magazine and subsequent investigation determined that one round had fired from the rifle.

On September 19, 2019, investigators assigned to FID and an instructor from the Police Rifle Tactical and Shotgun Unit, as closely as possible recreated the circumstances surrounding the NTUD. The reenactment confirmed that removing a rifle from the Department approved rifle rack with the safety off could result in the trigger being depressed if it encountered the extended trigger post adapter.

Injuries or Medical Treatment

No sworn personnel were injured during the incident. Officer Juatco completed an Employee's Report (Form No. 15.07) documenting his proximity to a rifle being discharged without ear protection.

Investigators' Notes

The below listed issues and concerns were identified during the investigation. On October 9, 2019, Lieutenant II James Antenucci, Serial No. 26784, FID, forwarded this information to Commander Robert Marino, Serial No. 27226, Commanding Officer, FID. Commander Marino then notified the Office of Operations and the appropriate Bureau Chief.

1. Non-Rifle Cadre Personnel Permitted to Manipulate Police Rifles.

Officer Chavez stated it is his common practice to familiarize all his probationary officers with the functions of the police rifle by allowing them to manipulate it. Officer Chavez promoted to PIII on September 3, 2017.

2. Officer Chavez Failed to Register his Private Purchase Rifle with the Department Armory.

- Officer Chavez stated he purchased his private rifle shortly after rifle school, but never physically brought it to the Department armory to be certified and have it placed in the Firearms Inventory and Tracking System (FITS) as instructed.
- Officer Chavez completed Rifle School on June 15, 2015 and purchased his rifle on August 31, 2015.
- Officer Chavez advised he had a scope and bi-pod installed onto his rifle at the Oak Tree range by LAPD staff. He believed this would suffice as registering his rifle with the Department.
- The rifle cadre staff at Oak Tree Range is permitted to install optional equipment, but do not have the capability of entering the rifle into FITS.
- After purchasing his private rifle, Officer Chavez did not turn in the rifle issued to him by the Department as instructed on Page 3, Paragraph 7 of his User Agreement.

3. Categorical Use of Force Protocols Not Followed.

- After the NTUD Officer Chavez removed the rifle from the rack, downloaded and secured it in the rifle case and then secured it in the kit room.
- Officer Chavez collected the DCC from inside the police vehicle.
- Officer Juatco unloaded the remainder of the officers' equipment from the rear of the vehicle.
- Public Safety Statement not obtained according to policy.

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CHIEF OF POLICE REPORT³

Chief of Police Findings

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Officer Juatco.

Unintentional Discharge – Administrative Disapproval, Negligent Discharge, Officer Juatco.

Chief of Police Analysis

Detention

- Does not apply.

Tactics

- Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *“The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance” (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

Officer Juatco’s tactics were not a factor in this incident, therefore, they were not reviewed or evaluated. However, as Department guidelines require personnel who are substantially involved in a Categorical Use of Force incident to attend a Tactical Debrief, the Chief determined that it would be appropriate to recommend a Tactics finding of Tactical Debrief.⁴

- During the review of this incident, the following Debriefing Point was noted:

Firearm Manipulations – Basic Firearm Safety Rules.

Tactical De-Escalation

- Does Not Apply

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

- **Firearm Manipulations** – Officer Juatco handled, manipulated, secured, unsecured, and prepared Officer Chavez’s Patrol Rifle to a “patrol ready” condition as he loaded

³ The information provided in this section summarizes the analysis and findings set forth in the Chief of Police’s report for this case.

⁴ A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all CUOF incidents within 90 calendar days of the conclusion of the BOPC review process. *LAPD Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.15.*

their police vehicle.⁵ Officer Chavez stated it was common practice to familiarize all his probationary officers with the functions of his Patrol Rifle by allowing them to manipulate it. Officer Juatco was not Department trained or certified to manipulate or deploy the Patrol Rifle. Officer Juatco is reminded that the handling and manipulation of a weapon system by Department personnel who are not trained or certified in its use, poses a risk to others as the weapon system should only be manipulated by Department personnel who are certified. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

- **Department-Wide Loading Standards** – Officer Juatco unknowingly and improperly loaded the Patrol Rifle as a result of his lack of knowledge of the weapon system. The Department has established loading standards to ensure officer safety and patrol readiness at all times. Officer Juatco is reminded that the loading of a Patrol Rifle is critical and that Department personnel who are not trained or certified in its use, pose a risk to others as the weapon system should only be manipulated by Department personnel who are certified. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control⁶

- *Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.*

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (LAPD, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical

⁵ Patrol Ready is the loading configuration of a weapon system. The configuration is to have a fully loaded magazine with no round chambered.

⁶ Training Bulletin-Command and Control was adopted by the Department July 31, 2018.

response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (LAPD Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, Emergency Operations Guide).

Lieutenant Weise responded to the WLA CPS parking lot and met with Officers Juatco and Chavez. Lieutenant Weise did not provide Officer Chavez with any direction regarding holding the scene for a CUOF investigation. Lieutenant Weise did not immediately separate Officers Juatco and Chavez, nor did he obtain a PSS from Officer Juatco. Lieutenant Weise returned to the watch commander's office and left Officers Juatco and Chavez unmonitored.

Officers Juatco and Chavez met with Lieutenant Weise in the watch commander's office after they had removed all of their equipment and secured it inside the kit room. Lieutenant Weise monitored both officers in the watch commander's office until he assigned Sergeant Briones to assume monitoring responsibilities of Officer Juatco. Sergeant Briones obtained a PSS from Officer Juatco and monitored Officer Juatco until relieved by FID Investigators.

Overall, the actions of Lieutenant Weise were not consistent with Department supervisory training of an incident commander during a critical incident and did not meet the Chief's expectations.

The actions of Sergeant Briones were consistent with Department supervisory training and met the Chief's expectations of field a supervisor during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

- Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvements could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

The Chief directed Officers Juatco, Chavez and Lieutenant Weise to attend a Tactical Debrief that shall include discussions pertaining to the Debriefing Topics along with the following mandatory topics:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

- Officer Juatco attended a GTU on September 26, 2019. All mandatory topics were covered, including Firearm Manipulations.

Unintentional Discharge

- *Firearms safety is critical. Officers must have the ability to draw, holster and manipulate weapons safely at all times, especially under stressful conditions. Firearms safety rules have been established based upon real life situations and are applicable at all times. Violations of any of the safety rules will not be tolerated.*

Basic Firearm Safety Rules

1. *All guns are always loaded.*
2. *Never allow the muzzle to cover anything you are not willing to shoot.*
3. *Keep your finger off the trigger until your sights are aligned on the target and you intend to shoot.*
4. *Be sure of your target.*

Officers are required to know and apply the Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules throughout their careers. These rules must be ingrained into an officer's natural thought process and become second nature. Any violation of the Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules may result in the unintentional discharge of a round. This is a serious matter with the potential of having tragic results.

For administrative purposes, the unintended discharge of a weapon is classified into two categories:

1. *Accidental discharge: An unintended discharge of a firearm as a result of a mechanical malfunction of the firearm, not involving the shooter.*
2. *Negligent discharge: An unintended discharge of a firearm as a result of a shooter not handling a weapon in a safe manner, violating one or more of the four basic firearm safety rules (Los Angeles Police Department Firearms Manual, July 2015).*

Administrative Disapproval - Negligent Discharge

- *Finding where it was determined that the unintentional discharge of a firearm resulted from operator error, such as the violation of a firearm safety rule (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

Officer Juatco – 5.56 caliber, Patrol Rifle, single round, which traveled in an upward trajectory through the roof of the police vehicle and emergency light-bar on top of the police vehicle.

According to Officer Juatco, he was in the driver's seat of his police vehicle that was parked in the parking lot of the WLA CPS. Officer Juatco logged off the MDC, turned toward the Patrol Rifle secured in the rifle rack and disengaged the locking mechanism with his left hand. Officer Juatco grabbed the handguard near the base of the barrel and pulled the Patrol Rifle toward him in order to remove it from the rifle rack. Officer Juatco's attempted removal resulted in one round being discharged from the rifle while it was seated in the rifle rack as it was pointed upward. This fired projectile exited through the roof of the police vehicle and emergency light bar on the top of the police vehicle.

Officer Juatco recalled, *"At start of watch - - as far as the rifle, I always - - usually I check the chamber to make sure there's no round in."*

*I think I racked it too far. I racked it back too far and it loaded a round into the chamber at start of watch...and then afterwards I should have checked it again, but I didn't check it again. I got complacent, and I loaded a loaded rifle in the rack at start of watch."*⁷

"At end of watch I told my partner that I would get everything downloaded, I would log us off the computer. I would get all of our equipment out of it and put it into the kit room."

*He said he had to finish some paperwork. He had to finish my weekly ratings. So he trusted me to go take care of whatever I had to take care of in the shop."*⁸

*"I logged us off the computer. I loaded the DICV. And the first weapon that I wanted to unload or take out of the shop was the rifle actually. So as I unlocked the rack for the shotgun - - or not the shotgun - - I'm sorry - - the rifle, I grabbed it by this part right here [Describing the base of the barrel right in front of the magazine port]."*⁹

*"I grabbed it as I unsecured the lock on the rifle rack. As I tried to pull it out, that is when a round went off into the - - into the roof - - or the ceiling of the black and white."*¹⁰

The Chair of the UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the circumstances and evidence related to the NTUD. The Chair of the UOFRB determined that the NTUD was the result of operator error. Officer Juatco inadvertently loaded the Patrol Rifle and then placed the loaded Patrol Rifle into the vehicle's rifle rack with the Patrol Rifle's safety disengaged.

⁷ Officer Juatco, Page 24, Lines 2-9.

⁸ Officer Juatco, Page 12, Lines 11-17.

⁹ Officer Juatco, Page 12, Lines 18-23.

¹⁰ Officer Juatco, Page 13, Lines 10-14.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Chair of the UOFRB determined and the Chief concurred, that the NTUD was the result of operator error and the manipulation of a weapon system that Officer Juatco was not authorized to use. Additionally, Officer Juatco failed to adhere to the Department's Basic Firearm Safety Rules, and therefore, requires a finding of Administrative Disapproval (AD), Negligent Discharge.

Injuries

- There were no injuries as a result of this NTUD.

Additional/Equipment

Officer Chavez

- **Firearm Manipulations** – Officer Juatco handled, manipulated, and prepared the Patrol Rifle to a patrol ready condition as he secured it in their police vehicle. Officer Chavez stated it was common practice to familiarize all his probationary officers with the functions of his Patrol Rifle by allowing them to manipulate the weapon system. Officer Juatco was not Department trained or certified to manipulate or deploy a Patrol Rifle, however, Officer Chavez allowed Officer Juatco to manipulate the weapon system. Additionally, Officer Chavez was not Department certified to provide instruction on the use of a Patrol Rifle.
- **Registering Private Purchase Rifle with Department Armory** – Officer Chavez completed Rifle School on June 15, 2015. On August 31, 2015, Officer Chavez privately purchased his Patrol Rifle for on-duty use. At the time of the NTUD, the only rifle listed on Officer Chavez' FITS record was a Department-issued rifle. Officer Chavez' private purchase Patrol Rifle was never presented to the Department armory to be certified and entered in FITS.
- **Returning Department Issued Equipment** – After the private purchase of his personal Patrol Rifle, Officer Chavez did not return the Department-issued Patrol Rifle as required, per the Department Agreement for Private Purchase of Patrol Rifle for Duty Use.
- **Preservation of Evidence** – The FID investigation revealed that following the NTUD, Officer Chavez looked inside of the police vehicle and observed the Patrol Rifle in the rifle rack with the locking mechanism open. Officer Chavez assumed the Patrol Rifle was loaded with a live round in the chamber and did not feel safe leaving the Patrol Rifle in that condition. Officer Chavez observed that the safety was disengaged in the "Off" position. Officer Chavez removed the Patrol Rifle from the rifle rack and cleared the live round from the chamber. Officer Chavez brought the Patrol Rifle into the WLA CPS, secured it in his rifle bag, and returned it to the kit

room. Additionally, Officer Chavez recovered a discharged cartridge casing from the front passenger seat and removed it from the police vehicle.

- **Maintaining the Integrity of the Crime Scene** – Prior to the arrival of FID investigators, Officer Chavez directed Officer Juatco to remove the shotgun, 40mm LLL, and all other equipment from the police vehicle. Having been directed by Officer Chavez, Officer Juatco removed the remainder of the equipment from their police vehicle and returned it to the kit room.

The above identified issues concerning Officer Chavez were brought to the attention of Captain R. Goddard, Serial No. 32757, WLA Patrol Division, Commanding Officer, who directed Officer Chavez be removed from the Rifle Cadre, receive Divisional Training, along with the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI). In addition, Captain J. Tom, Serial No. 32993, WLA Area, Commanding Officer, directed that Officer Chavez be issued a Notice to Correct Deficiencies. The Commanding Officer of Operations – West Bureau (OWB) and the Director of Office of Operations (OO) concurred with these actions. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

Lieutenant Weise¹¹

- **Protocols Subsequent to CUOF** – Lieutenant Weise was inside the watch commander's office when he heard a loud noise, shortly afterward; he was notified by Officer Chavez of the NTUD. Lieutenant Weise proceeded to the parking lot of the WLA CPS and met with the officers. Lieutenant Weise verified what had occurred and that there were no injuries. Lieutenant Weise did not immediately separate Officers Juatco and Chavez, nor did he obtain a PSS from Officer Juatco. Lieutenant Weise did not give Officer Chavez any direction regarding holding the scene for the CUOF investigation. Lieutenant Weise returned to the watch commander's office to make the necessary notifications, and left Officers Juatco and Chavez unmonitored.
- **Watch Commander's Daily Report** – Lieutenant Weise's Watch Commander's Daily Report, dated September 14, 2019, did not document the separation and monitoring of Officers Juatco and Chavez, nor did it indicate that a CUOF incident had occurred.

The above identified issues regarding Lieutenant Weise were brought to the attention of Captain Goddard, who provided Lieutenant Weise with divisional training and issued an Employee Comment Sheet, along with the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OWB and the Director of OO concurred with these actions. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

¹¹ Lieutenant Weise retired from the Department on January 19, 2020.

Audio/Video Recordings

- **Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)/Body Worn Video (BWV)** – Officer Juatco's NTUD occurred while he was on-duty, however, at the time of occurrence, Officer Juatco was in the parking lot at WLA CPS, preparing to remove his equipment from the vehicle as he was at the end of his shift. Therefore, DICVS and BWV were not activated during this incident.
- **Surveillance Video** – A WLA CPS surveillance camera that was affixed to the west facing wall was located approximately five feet above the ground. The camera was pointed in a southwest direction and captured the responding personnel. The video footage did not record any audio. The surveillance video was reviewed and was consistent with the FID investigation.

Chief's Direction

- In order to enhance the future performance of Department personnel, the Chief advised the Director, Office of Support Services, to ensure that all personnel review the Department video addressing unintentional discharges of firearms, dated January 15, 2020, along with the corresponding Chief of Police message. Additionally, the Chief directed that during all rifle school training, and recertification instruction, there be a re-iteration and strong emphasis on the prohibition of handling the Patrol Rifle by personnel who are not certified. The aforementioned unintentional discharges of firearms video from Training Division, Firearms Training Section, demonstrates the safe handling of firearms and reviews the Basic Firearm Safety Rules to prevent unintentional discharges through the emphasis of the safe handling of firearms.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW

Inspector General Analysis

Investigation Quality

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to investigation quality.

Training Issues

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to training.

Equipment Issues

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to equipment.

Detention

- Does Not Apply.

Tactical De-escalation

- Does Not Apply.

Inspector General Recommendations

Tactics

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.

Drawing/Exhibiting

- Does Not Apply.

Unintentional Discharge

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.



MARK P. SMITH
Inspector General